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THE POLICING OF MAJOR EVENTS IN CANADA: LESSONS FROM TORONTO’S
G20 AND VANCOUVER’S OLYMPICS
W. Wesley Pue
Robert Diab
Grace Jackson*
Major events ranging from sporting events to major international conferences too
often result in disorder, deployment of riot squads, and mass arrests. Events
surrounding a meeting of the G20 in Toronto and those at Vancouver’s Winter
Olympics provide insight into the ways in which things can go wrong and the
ways in which they can go well at major events. This article employs a “thick
history” of events in order to explore gaps in Canadian law, including gaps
between “law in the books” and “law in action.”
The legal frameworks governing large-scale events affect the likelihood of
success measured in public safety, minimization of disorder, and protection of
basic liberties. Surprisingly, large events often proceed without the benefit of a
developed legal framework, leading to confusion among federal police, local
police, and civil authority. We assess past reliance on the common law, a
Vancouver City bylaw, Ontario’s Public Works Protection Act [PWPA], and the
policing and security provisions of the federal Foreign Missions and International
Organizations Act (Foreign Missions Act) in order to determine which sorts of
legal arrangements are most conducive to successful event management. Since
major events in Canada are most often developed in law’s penumbra, without the
benefit of clear legal authority or statutory direction governing the measures that
are required, both effective management and ordinary liberties are compromised.
A “worst of both worlds” outcome destabilizes police–citizen relationships and
leaves individuals uncertain as to the durability of their rights of property,
speech, assembly, movement, and personal integrity. Equally, police forces are
left insecure as to the lawful means by which they should perform their duties. A
comparison of the two events provides the pathology and a prescription,
illustrating the need for legislation to govern the management of major events.
Trop souvent, la tenue de grands événements, comme les événements sportifs ou
les grandes conférences internationales, mène au chaos, au déploiement
d’escouades anti-émeute et à des arrestations massives. Un retour sur les
événements entourant la tenue d’un sommet du G20 à Toronto et des Jeux
olympiques d’hiver de Vancouver nous donne un aperçu des choses qui peuvent
bien fonctionner et des dérapages possibles à ces occasions. Dans le présent
*
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article, nous passons en revue ces événements afin d’explorer les lacunes que
comporte le droit canadien, y compris les écarts entre le droit théorique et le
droit pratique.
Les paramètres juridiques qui régissent les événements de grande envergure
influent sur l’efficacité des mesures liées à la sécurité publique, à la restriction
des risques de chaos et à la protection des libertés fondamentales. Fait étonnant,
les grands événements se déroulent souvent sans qu’un cadre juridique ait été mis
au point, ce qui mène à la confusion entre les autorités policières fédérales et
locales et les autorités civiles. Nous nous penchons tour à tour sur l’application
passée des règles de common law, d’un règlement de la ville de Vancouver, de la
Loi sur la protection des ouvrages publics de l’Ontario et des dispositions
relatives à la surveillance policière et à la sécurité de la Loi sur les missions
étrangères et les organisations internationales (loi fédérale) afin de déterminer
les types de mesures juridiques les plus susceptibles d’assurer une gestion réussie
des événements. Étant donné que les grands événements tenus au Canada sont
planifiés le plus souvent dans la pénombre du droit, en l’absence d’une
autorisation juridique ou de directives législatives claires régissant les mesures
qui sont nécessaires, tant la gestion efficace que les libertés ordinaires sont
compromises. Lorsque la situation dégénère et que le pire survient, les relations
entre la police et les citoyens sont déstabilisées et les individus s’interrogent sur
la durabilité de leurs droits de propriété ainsi que de leurs droits de s’exprimer,
de se rassembler, de se déplacer et de protéger leur intégrité personnelle. De leur
côté, les forces policières ont des doutes sur les moyens légaux auxquels elles
peuvent recourir pour exercer leurs fonctions.
Nous comparons les deux événements afin de présenter la pathologie et une
prescription mettant en lumière la nécessité d’adopter un texte législatif régissant
la gestion des grands événements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent reviews of policing at Toronto’s G20 Summit and Vancouver’s Olympics provide
unprecedented insight into the law and practice of large event policing in Canada.1 These two
1

See Margaret Beare & Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds, Putting the State on Trial: The Policing of Protest during the
G20 Summit (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2015); Gerry McNeilly, Office of the
Independent Police Review Director, Policing the Right to Protest: G20 Systemic Review Report (Toronto:
Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2012) [OIPRD Report]; Ian McPhail, Civilian Review and
Complaints Commission for the RCMP, Public Interest Investigation into RCMP Member Conduct Related to
the 2010 G8 and G20 Summits (Ottawa: Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP, 2012) [CPC
Report]; John W Morden, Toronto Police Services Board, Independent Civilian Review into Matters Relating to
the G20 Summit (Toronto: Toronto Police Services Board, 2012) [TPSB Review]; André Marin, Ombudsman,
Caught in the Act: Investigation into the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services’ Conduct in
Relation to Ontario Regulation 233/10 under the Public Works Protection Act (Toronto: Ombudsman Ontario,
2010) [Ombudsman’s Report]; Ontario Special Investigations Unit, “SIU Concludes Six Investigations into
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enormous events were held 4,000 kilometres apart in the same year. Different in character and
managed under contrasting legal frameworks, they provide a natural experiment of sorts through
which to assess the legal conditions most conducive to success. Taken together, they offer unique
visibility into the legal and operational environments that shape law’s practical outcomes,
providing new insights into the way Canada’s laws are understood and applied by the officials
charged with their application and how that in turn affects the likelihood of successful event
management.
We approach the material and the problem through a form of socio-legal enquiry, engaging a
“thick history” of events in order to more fully understand the interaction of law and outcomes in
the choreographies of large events.2 We approach “law” through judicial decisions, statutes, and
regulations but also as a living reality shaped and applied by officials. In seeking to understand
how and to what extent law conditions action, we probe the “gaps” between the law as written,
the law as understood by the officials charged with implementing it, and the law that lies
between these two forms and the actual outcomes.3 We use official records to excavate “law in
action.”4
Specifically, the assessment of the two events offers new insights into the ways in which the
common law, a municipal bylaw, a provincial statute, and the policing and security provisions of

2
3

4

Injuries during the G20 Summit,” News Release 10-TCI-118 (25 November 2010), online:
<http://www.siu.on.ca>; Ontario Special Investigations Unit, “Toronto Police Service Police Officer Charged,”
News Release 10-TCI-118 (21 December 2010), online: <http://www.siu.on.ca>; House of Commons, Standing
Committee on Public Safety and National Security, “Issues Surrounding Security at the G8 and G20 Summits:
Report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security” (March 2011) (Chair: Kevin
Sorenson); National Union of Public and General Employees and Canadian Civil Liberties Association, “Breach
of the Peace, G20 Summit: Accountability in Policing and Governance” (Ottawa, 2011) [“Breach of the
Peace”]; Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), “Consolidated after Action Report: Muskoka G8 Summit 2010
Toronto G20 Summit” (2011); R Roy McMurtry, Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services,
Report of the Review of the Public Works Protection Act (Toronto: Ministry of Community Safety and
Correctional Services, 2001); Adam Molnar & Lauren Snider, “Mega-Events, Mega-Profits: Unpacking the
Vancouver 2010 Security-Development Nexus” in Colin J Bennett & Kevin D Haggerty, eds, Security Games:
Surveillance and Control at Mega-Events (New York: Routledge, 2011) 150; Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, “Games Security and Public Safety for the Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games,” online:
<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/aud-ver/reports-rapports/pp-gs-ps-eval-eng.htm>.
Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture” in The Interpretation of
Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 3.
As David Nelken has stated, “the effects of normative legal or administrative guidelines to behaviour could not
be understood without reference to the way in which they were refracted by the social environment.” David
Nelken, “The ‘Gap Problem’ in the Sociology of Law: A Theoretical Review” (1981) 1 Windsor YB Access
Just 35 at 43. See also David Nelken, Beyond Law in Context: Developing a Sociological Understanding of Law
(London: Ashgate, 2009); Michael McCann emphasizes the centrality of the “gap problem” in socio-legal
studies in Michael McCann, “2013 LSA Presidential Address: The Unbearable Lightness of Rights: On
Sociolegal Inquiry in the Global Era” (2014) 48:2 Law & Soc’y Review 245 at 246. See also Jon Gould & Scott
Barclay, “Mind the Gap: The Place of Gap Studies in Sociolegal Scholarship” (2012) 8 Ann Rev Law & Soc
Sci 323 at 323–335.
Roscoe Pound is generally credited with originating the approach to law and society research that focuses on the
actual effects of legal rules rather than only on their assumed rationale and effect. See Roscoe Pound, “Law in
Books and Law in Action” (1910) 44 Am L Rev 12.
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the federal Foreign Missions Act interact.5 In exploring each of these in the context of real
events, unfortunate lacunae in the legal framework become apparent. Gaps arise from the false
assumption that event management is co-extensive with security planning, from confusion over
the boundaries between federal and provincial authority to the failure of any level of government
in Canada to establish a comprehensive legal framework for the management of large events.
II. BACKGROUND
Toronto’s 2010 G20 Summit and associated meetings of the G8 in nearby Huntsville
constituted one of the “largest domestic security operations in Canadian history.”6 Although
delegates were protected and meetings proceeded more or less uninterrupted, things did not go
well. Widespread disorder played out on the streets of Toronto. On one occasion, an organized
group of troublemakers engaged in a rampage of vandalism, while police did nothing. Property
was destroyed, and members of the public were frightened.7 On other occasions, law-abiding
individuals were interfered with, attacked, confined, detained, or otherwise abused by police.8
Over 1,000 people were arrested, often held under deplorable conditions, without legal
justification. James Stribopoulos observes that of the 1,105 individuals arrested, only 321 were
charged, of whom 204 had charges “stayed, withdrawn or dismissed. In short, nearly 90 percent
of those arrested … were quite possibly innocent of any wrongdoing.”9
Police forces struggled to plan for and manage the G20 events on short notice and unworkable
time frames.10 An inadequate legal framework contributed significantly to the difficulties. In all
of this upheaval, the G20/G8 was dramatic but, sadly, not uncommon. Canada does not have a

5

6
7

8
9

10

City of Vancouver, Bylaw no 9962 on Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (3 December
2009) [Bylaw 9962]; Public Works Protection Act, RSO 1990, c P.55, as repealed by Security for Electricity
Generating Facilities and Nuclear Facilities Act, 2014, SO 2014, c 15, Schedule 1, s 1 [PWPA]; Foreign
Missions and International Organizations Act, SC 2002, c 12, s 10.1 [Foreign Missions Act].
OIPRD Report, supra note 1 at iii.
Scholarship and official reports emerging in the aftermath of the events document this extensively as did news
coverage. Examples of news coverage include: Christie Blatchford, “Black Bloc Interrupted Soldier’s Cortège:
Blair”, Globe and Mail (1 July 2010), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>; Postmedia News, “Ottawa Agrees
to Pay Businesses Nearly $2M in G8/G20 Compensation”, National Post (15 June 2011), online:
<www.nationalpost.com>.
Kelly Grant, “Police Chief Offers No Apologies for G20 Tactics”, Globe and Mail (28 June 2010), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com>.
James Stribopoulos, “The Rule of Law on Trial: Police Powers, Public Protest and the G20” in Beare & Des
Rosiers, supra note 1, 105 at 105–106. See also eg the arrest of 108 people on the early morning of 27 June as
they awoke in a gymnasium at the University of Toronto and the “kettling incident” later the same day, in which
police boxed in some 400 protesters and others at a downtown intersection confining them in place for four
hours during a torrential rainfall (OIPRD Report, supra note 1 at 142–157). See also the criticism of the
conditions and procedures for booking and detaining suspects at a temporary holding facility created for the
event (OIPRD Report, supra note 1 at 200–242).
See eg the OIPRD Report, supra note 1; Beare & Des Rosiers, supra note 1.
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good record when it comes to large event policing.11 The ways in which the Vancouver
Olympics provide a useful counterpoint will be examined below.
III. CANADIAN LAW OF LARGE EVENT POLICING
One factor auguring against success is the surprising failure of Canada’s legislatures to set out
a legal framework for the management of large events. Common sense dictates that special
arrangements need to be made wherever very large numbers gather. This is about more than
policing protests. Authorities need the power to limit access to public space, restrict the freedom
of movement, constrain the means and location of expression, and conduct searches of persons
and property in a fashion that is not generally tolerable in a free society. Some measures are
needed to ensure the security of an event as such. Others facilitate the exercise of the freedoms of
movement, expression, protest, and assembly by ensuring the safety and convenience of people
in the area, including demonstrators. All of this is routine at such events, though it is most often
done without clear legal authority.12
Legal authority was bootstrapped into being for each of the 2010 events when that surprising
fact was recognized by responsible officials. An aging and mostly forgotten statute was dusted
off and secretly invoked for the Toronto events, while a city bylaw, enacted in full public view,
served to bridge the void in Vancouver.13 As a result, the G20 meetings were plagued by
11

12

13

Investigations of the 1997 Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in Vancouver provided
useful guidance as to general principles but not as rich an insight into the ways in which operational and legal
concerns jointly shaped policing. Previous discussions of large-event policing in Canada, including the APEC
affair, include W Wesley Pue, ed, Pepper in Our Eyes: The APEC Affair (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000) [Pue,
Pepper in Our Eyes]; Robert Diab & W Wesley Pue, “The Gap in Canadian Police Powers: Canada Needs
‘Public Order Policing’ Legislation” (2010) 28 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 87 at 87–107 [Diab & Pue, “The
Gap in Canadian Police Powers”]; Robert Diab & W Wesley Pue, “Security for the 2010 Olympics: The Gap in
Police Powers under Canadian Law”, The Advocate (September 2009); W Wesley Pue, “Trespass and
Expressive Rights” (Ipperwash Inquiry, 2007) [Pue, “Trespass and Expressive Rights”]; Lorne Sossin, “The
Oversight of Executive Police Relations in Canada: The Constitution, the Courts, Administrative Processes and
Democratic Governance” (Ipperwash Inquiry, 2004); Margaret Beare and Tonita Murray, eds, Police and
Government Relations: Who’s Calling the Shots (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) at 131–134; W
Wesley Pue, “The Prime Minister’s Police? Commissioner Hughes’ APEC report” (2001) 39:1 Osgoode Hall
LJ 165 [Pue, “The Prime Minister’s Police”]; W Wesley Pue, “Executive Accountability and the APEC Inquiry:
Comment on ‘Ruling on Applications to Call Additional Government Witnesses’” (2000) 34 UBC L Rev 335
[Pue, “Executive Accountability and the APEC Inquiry”]. In an important paper prepared for the Ipperwash
Inquiry in 2004, Willem de Lint, “Public Order Policing in Canada: An Analysis of Operations in Recent High
Stakes Events” (Ipperwash Inquiry, 2004) reviews large-event policing at Oka, Burnt Church, APEC
(Vancouver), the Organization of American States (Windsor), the Summit of the Americas (Quebec City), and
the G8 meetings held at Kananaskis.
A vague statutory provision incorporated in the Foreign Missions Act, supra note 5, granting the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) authority over security at inter-governmental meetings does little to resolve
the multifarious matters related to managing and policing such events (explored in more detail below). We leave
aside the possibility of efforts to inhibit the exercise of these rights under the guise of “security” or “safety.”
Any such effort would be clearly unlawful, as Commissioner Hughes concluded in his report on policing at
Vancouver’s 1997 APEC conference. See Pue, “The Prime Minister’s Police”, ibid.
PWPA, supra note 5; Bylaw 9962, supra note 5.
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confusion despite Herculean efforts by civil servants and police. At the Olympics, in marked
contrast, the bylaw established a framework for the regulation of public space, the movement of
people, and crowd management.14 Officials enjoyed clarity as to both their mission and authority,
and inter-agency confusion was minimal. Things went well.
A. Limits of Authority for Public Order Policing in Canada
The main statutory provision governing the policing of major international conferences is
found in the Foreign Missions Act. No equivalent federal statute governs international sporting
events, and there is no similar provision in provincial legislation. The policing portion of the Act
is brief:
10.1 (1) The Royal Canadian Mounted Police has the primary responsibility to
ensure the security for the proper functioning of any intergovernmental
conference in which two or more states participate, that is attended by persons
granted privileges and immunities under this Act and to which an order made or
continued under this Act applies.
(2) For the purpose of carrying out its responsibility under subsection (1), the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police may take appropriate measures, including
controlling, limiting or prohibiting access to any area to the extent and in a
manner that is reasonable in the circumstances.15
Subsection 3 clarifies that the Act is not intended to affect any statutory or common law powers
of police, and subsection 4 allows for arrangements to be entered into between federal and
provincial or municipal authorities. This is the full extent of the legislation.
We will have more to say about the ambiguities and gaps in this light-touch statutory
framework later in this article. It sets out the authority of the federal police force in relation to
the security and functioning of international governmental conferences. Other matters, even
nearby and at the same time, are outside of its scope. Moreover, the restriction to intergovernmental conferences (federal jurisdiction) means that other occasions triggering large
gatherings that are likely to significantly disrupt the ordinary ebb and flow of urban living are not
covered. Many other commonplace events, such as summer festivals, firework displays, major
sport competitions, celebratory gatherings, religious assemblies, demonstrations, protests, and
labour unrest, also bring large numbers of people together in public spaces, where they are
sometimes fired up by emotion or intoxicants or both.16 Any such occasion can threaten disorder.
Sporting events such as the Olympics or Pan American Games are international in character,
14

15
16

The two cases differ in other critical respects. For the Winter Olympics, eg, a four-year lead time facilitated
thorough preparation, allowed productive discussions with protest leaders, and permitted a more complete
attention to police operations than was possible in the four months of preparation for the G20 Summit.
Foreign Missions Act, supra note 5.
See eg Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP, “CPC Releases Investigation Report into the
Search and Seizure of Alcohol by the Police in Victoria, BC on Canada Day 2008”, News Release (27 March
2009), online: <www.newswire.ca> (indicating “Police efforts to curb excessive alcohol consumption and
rowdiness at civic celebrations may need municipal or provincial legislative support”).
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requiring a federal presence, but they are not conferences of the sort captured by the Foreign
Missions Act’s policing provisions.
Managing urban co-existence, while attending to the needs of very large crowds and
facilitating safe movement and free expression has led police to refine their techniques over time.
The modern repertoire includes fenced perimeters, designated “protest zones,” and intrusive,
atypical surveillance, search, or detention. The wisdom of taking some such measures is obvious.
Properly calibrated and applied, all may be prudent in some circumstances.17 Outside of the
“intergovernmental conference” context, however, the statutory or common law authority for
most such measures is thin.18 Even in this one circumstance, a fuzzy boundary between
provincial and federal jurisdiction confounds.
It is common to discuss all that takes place in making arrangements for major events under
the rubric of “security” or the management of “protests” or “public order.” Although this is the
most common language employed by police and security officials, government spokespersons,
and academic commentators, this language distorts understanding. It turns out that not everything
that happens around an inter-governmental conference is connected directly to the meeting’s
security and functioning. Leaving aside protection from aerial, missile, or similar attacks –
important but beyond our scope19 – at least four different sorts of needs arise:
1. Security for the event itself: whether a major event is a hockey game in a
sports arena or a meeting of international leaders at a conference facility,
security must be provided for participants when they travel, eat, and sleep.
Security for the event itself, for its immediate environs and access points, and
for the delegates as they move to and fro must be assured.
2. The management of vehicle and pedestrian traffic: when unusually large
numbers of people convene in public spaces such as roads, sidewalks,
17

18

19

Other features of large-event policing are troubling, though outside our scope. Lesley Wood identifies a
disturbing catalogue in “Reorganizing Repression: Policing Protest 1995–2012” in Beare & Des Rosiers, supra
note 1, 44 at 57–58: “[I]t is not unusual to have pre-emptive raids of activist spaces, surveillance and
infiltration, barricaded areas, large numbers of arrests, and less lethal weapons. There is an escalation in the
frequency of the use of some militarized tactics, and the costs of providing security at such events. There is also
some variation between the US and Canadian contexts. Mass arrests, and the subsequent class action lawsuits,
are much more routine in the US, whereas, pepper spray, tear gas and TASERing of protesters more common in
Canada. Despite these differences, however, a generalized approach has consolidated since 1999.” (One could
argue that the shift began, not in Seattle in 1999, but in Vancouver two years earlier; nonetheless, the evolution
is there to be seen over something like this period).
Foreign Missions Act, supra note 5. The Quebec National Assembly’s passage of Bill 78 in 2012 was only a
partial and temporary exception in that the bill (which was in force for roughly two months) required that public
protests involving ten or more persons be preceded by at least eight hours’ notice to police of the “date, time,
duration and venue of the demonstration as well as its route, if applicable.” Bill 78, An Act to Enable Students to
Receive Instruction from the Postsecondary Institutions They Attend, 2nd Sess, 39th Leg, Quebec, 2012, s 16.
Kent Roach identifies the many “security” operations outside of the police that come into play at major
international events. Other agencies include the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the military, the
Canadian Border Services Agency, the Communications Security Establishment Canada, and the Joint
Intelligence Group. See Kent Roach, “Post 9/11 Policing of Protests: Symbolic but Illusionary Law Reform and
Real Accountability Gaps” in Beare & Des Rosiers, supra note 1, 64 at 64–83.
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thoroughfares, and pathways, normal modes of transportation and personal
movement are disrupted. Sheer volume disrupts ordinary patterns of urban
life. Minimizing public inconvenience requires careful forward planning that
may involve limiting access to some public spaces. Further restrictions arising
from the needs of event security or safe transportation for delegates compound
the challenges respecting traffic flow. All of this inevitably has a secondary
effect of constraining the time and manner of protests, though that is not
properly the intent.
3. The facilitation of collective expression: The management of time and space
where the right to exercise collective expression is engaged requires wisdom.
It is important to strike an appropriate balance between the protection of the
public, the facilitation of movement for people generally, and a full and
complete respect for the freedoms of assembly and expression. Steering
crowds away from crush points20 may suggest a need for “buffer zones” that
are larger than the need for security alone would dictate.21
4. Law enforcement: The apprehension of violent individuals or of vandals
operating under cover of a crowd, whether politically motivated (for example,
the black bloc) or otherwise (as at hockey celebrations), as well as riot control
are proper law enforcement activities that may, predictably, be required when
large events take place.
1. Common Law Authority on Police Powers
It is helpful to bear these distinct needs in mind when assessing the legal frameworks required
by very large events. The policing provisions of the Foreign Missions Act speak only to the first
– and then only in the context of international conferences. So too, the common law fails to
sufficiently address these diverse needs. As a practical matter, it operates at a level of principle
and generality that falls far short of codification. It is neither clear enough nor sufficiently
precise to direct the zoning of city centres and the regulation of movement over extended
territories and for extended periods of time. As Stribopoulos observes,
20

21

For the hazards of crushing, see eg John J Fruin, “The Causes and Prevention of Crowd Disasters” (paper
delivered at the First International Conference for Crowd Safety, London, England, March 1993), revised for
crowdsafe.com (January 2002), online: <www.crowdsafe.com/FruinCauses.pdf>; see also Health and Safety
Executive, “Crown Management” (Government of the United Kingdom), online: <www.hse.gov.uk/eventsafety/crowd-management.htm>, which identifies the “hazards presented by a crowd” as including crushing
(“between people” or “against fixed structures, such as barriers,” “trampling underfoot,” “surging, swaying or
rushing,” “aggressive behaviour,” and “dangerous behaviour, such as climbing on equipment or throwing
objects”).
The creation of exclusion zones designed to shield dignitaries from awareness of protest would, however, be an
improper interference with constitutionally protected freedoms. Commission for Public Complaints against the
RCMP, Commission Interim Report Following a Public Hearing into the Complaints Regarding the Events
That Took Place in Connection with Demonstrations during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Conference in Vancouver, B.C., in November 1977 at the UBC Campus and Richmond Detachments of the
RCMP (Ottawa: Commission for Public Complaints, RCMP, July 2001) [APEC Report]; Pue, “The Prime
Minister’s Police” supra note 11 at 178–180.
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[t]he principal problem with allowing the common law to continue supplying the
governing legal framework … is that it provides few clear answers. On a practical
level, this means that the police will continue to do what they perceive as
necessary. … But as the statistics from the G20 Summit in Toronto aptly
demonstrate, there will in all likelihood be a great many arrests, comparatively
few prosecutions, and even fewer trials. In short, true accountability remains
illusory.22
The infringement of the rights, freedoms, and liberties of those whose lives are disrupted by
official actions, even though they keep well away from protests and, thus, never face the threat of
arrest, are even less likely to be adjudicated.
In any event, the common law is mistrustful of official claims of authority. It does not confer
plenary powers on police. Stated baldly, this is so obvious as to seem trite. Nonetheless,
confusion has arisen in fact as a result of some Canadian officials misconstruing the doctrine of
ancillary police powers rather badly. This doctrine holds that police are accorded certain powers
under common law that are necessarily ancillary to their ordinary duties, including the
preservation of the peace. “Preserving the peace” is a legal term of art and, although it sounds
like it might encompass almost anything, that is not the case. Courts over the centuries have been
cautious not to allow this general duty to serve as a backdoor through which unlimited official
authority enters. The reductio ad absurdum serves as caution. Stretched too far, almost any
conduct, no matter how intrusive, could be defended as “ancillary” to the mission of preserving
the peace and preventing crime. Free societies do not proceed in this fashion, and common law
courts have not allowed this result. Bluntly, “[a] society that valued police efficiency and
effectiveness above other values would be a police state.”23
R v Knowlton is the leading Canadian authority on police restrictions of access to spaces such
as streets, parks, and other places normally open to the public.24 In this case, the Supreme Court
of Canada upheld the arrest of an individual who had refused police instructions to keep off a
small portion of a public sidewalk. The area in question was immediately adjacent to the private
property of Edmonton’s Chateau Lacombe Hotel, which was then hosting Soviet Premier Alexey
Kosygin. Security, of necessity, was tight. Kosygin’s visit to Canada had not only provoked

22

23
24

Stribopoulos, supra note 9 at 115. The contrary (that the common law is sufficient) view was recently stated,
albeit in passing and without full consideration, by the esteemed Honorary R. Roy McMurtry, supra note 1.
These observations are presented in the context of an analysis of the inadequacies of Ontario’s PWPA, supra
note 5, as a framework for policing significant events and without a full analysis of the common law powers of
the police. For the latter, see Diab & Pue, “The Gap in Canadian Police Powers”, supra note 11. No other report
on the G20 Summit addressed the question directly. Ontario’s ombudsman focused on the actions of a
provincial ministry, a report prepared for the Toronto Police Board focused primarily on the way the Police
Board engaged with policing agencies, and the Office of the Independent Police Review Director focused
mainly on a series of operational and tactical missteps by police. See sources cited in note 2, supra.
R v Clayton, 2007 SCC 32, [2007] 2 SCR 725 at para 59 [Clayton].
R v Knowlton, [1974] SCR 443, 22 DLR (3d) 755 (Fauteux CJ) [Knowlton].
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protests but also violence. Bombs had been discovered near the Russian embassy,25 and Kosygin
had been attacked while walking on Parliament Hill with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Quite
understandably, Edmonton police were on tenterhooks as they sought to avoid another
international incident. Anxiety was heightened in a province where many traced their family
origins to communist-ruled Eastern Europe. The question for the court was whether Knowlton’s
arrest in such circumstances – the hotel property, the adjoining sidewalk, the security concerns –
was lawful. The trial judge thought not:
[T]he police at the relevant time were not enforcing any provisions of the
Criminal Code, or any bylaw or other law and that therefore they were not acting
in the execution of their duty and that therefore the accused could not have been
obstructing them and therefore not guilty of the offence of obstruction. Finding as
I do there was not any law being enforced the accused could not have been found
committing an offence so as to justify an arrest without a warrant and therefore
the charge is dismissed.26
In the particular circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court of Canada took a different view
but did not disagree with the fundamental principle: an unlawful interference with a person’s
liberty does not become lawful simply because done by police, whose authority derives only
from statute or from clear common law authority.27
On the facts, it was clear that police, acting on the authority of the landowner, could lawfully
have prevented entry to the Chateau Lacombe’s property. It was the further step of restricting
access to public land adjacent to the hotel that rendered the case difficult. On the facts of the
case, the Supreme Court of Canada felt this action was permissible as a necessary consequence
of constables’ ancient common law duty to preserve the peace and prevent crime.28 The
particular facts of Knowlton suggest its limits.29 It involved a de minimus intrusion on freedom of
movement ancillary to the proper function of protecting private property, which was met,
perhaps, by a brittle and unreasonable stance on Mr. Knowlton’s part. At stake were a limited
intrusion, a small physical space, and restrictions of short duration.
Since Knowlton, the common law doctrine of “ancillary police powers” has been held to
authorize short investigative detentions or the search of persons, vehicles, or premises where
necessary to preserve evidence, to ensure the safety of police officers, or to prevent the

25
26
27
28
29

“Metro Socred Candidate Held in Ottawa. Attack on Kosygin Shameful: PM”, Globe and Mail (19 October
1971) at 1; “Kosygin Shaken Up in Ottawa Attack”, Milwaukee Sentinel (19 October 1971) at 1.
As quoted in Knowlton, supra note 24 at 445.
Ibid at 446, citing Regina v Waterfield, [1964] 1 QB 164 at 170.
This common law authority was given statutory expression in the Police Act, RSA 2000, c P-17, ss 38-41.
It is elementary legal method that the rule in a case (its ratio decidendi) is limited by the factual circumstances
generating judicial statements. See eg ATH Smith, Glanville Williams: Learning the Law, 15th ed (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at 96: “[T]he ratio decidendi of a case can be defined as the material facts of the case
plus the decision thereon.”
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continuation of an offence.30 A need to respond quickly to unanticipated new or developing
situations and inherent limitations of time and space are common features of such decisions.
Construing the “ancillary” powers doctrine as having imported a general police power to seal off
large public spaces, to search or detain large numbers without cause, and to do both for periods
of days, however, would be taking Knowlton into new territory.
Two important cases illustrate the limits of ancillary police powers. In Dedman v The Queen,
Justice Gerald Le Dain crafted a test to be applied prior to establishing new “ancillary” police
powers.31 This test involved weighing:
1. whether the interference is necessary to carrying out a particular police duty;
and
2. whether it is reasonable, having regard to
a. the nature of the liberty interfered with, and
b. the importance of the public purpose served by the interference.
On the facts in this case, a majority of the court upheld random traffic stops that had been
implemented in order to reduce impaired driving. The particular police duty to which an
ancillary power adhered was derived from a scheme of statutory regulation involving the
licensing of both vehicles and drivers. The majority of the court viewed driving, not as one
among many means of exercising ordinary freedoms of movement but as a licensed and highly
regulated activity. That being the case, the seriousness of drunk driving and the “slight”
infringement” associated with a brief traffic stop rendered this practice properly an “ancillary”
police power.32 In other words, powers to detain briefly or to “search” are permissible under the
doctrine where necessary to fulfill (“ancillary” to) a clearly established police function. Even
then, the particular exercise of power must be reasonably proportionate to the threat presented by
the specific harm. It should be noted that this is an additional requirement, not the elevation of a
“reasonableness test” in lieu of the other components.
A similar approach was adopted in Cloutier v Langlois, which considered the lawfulness of a
“frisk search” conducted at the time of arrest.33 Again, a rigorous two-stage test was applied. The
Supreme Court of Canada asked, first, whether either a statute or the common law imposes a
particular duty on peace officers. The duty must be “clearly identified” and historically
recognized by the courts. Only if it is thus established does the second question come into play:
was the action necessary to the fulfillment of the duty?34 Only such powers as are necessary to
the performance of well-established police duties are to be inferred. Ancillary powers are
tethered tightly to explicit statutory duties and to specific, well-established, common law

30
31
32
33
34

R v Mann, 2004 SCC 52, rev’g 2002 MBCA 121 [Mann]; R v Greaves, 2004 BCCA 484 [Greaves]; Dedman v
The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 2 [Dedman].
Ibid.
Ibid at para 69.
Cloutier v Langlois, [1990] 1 SCR 158 [Cloutier].
Ibid at 182–183.
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duties.35 Constables’ general obligations to preserve the peace or prevent crime cannot provide a
sufficient hook on which to hang ancillary powers, for that would generate a novel and
dangerous relationship between police, the law, and the community at large. Any such approach
would de-link police powers from legislative conferral. As Chief Justice Brian Dickson
observed,
[a] police officer is not empowered to execute his or her duty by unlawful means.
The public interest in law enforcement cannot be allowed to override the
fundamental principle that all public officials, including the police, are subject to
the rule of law. To find that arbitrary police action is justified simply because it is
directed at the fulfilment of police duties would be to sanction a dangerous
exception to the supremacy of law. It is the function of the legislature, not the
courts, to authorize arbitrary police action that would otherwise be unlawful as a
violation of rights traditionally protected at common law.36
As in Dedman, the Court required also that exercises of “ancillary” police power be reasonably
calibrated to the nature of the liberty interfered with, taking account of all competing public
interests. In short, for a lawful ancillary police power to be asserted it must be both necessary
and reasonably calibrated and appended to a clear and particular police duty. No short-cut allows
any of these components to be skipped over or diluted.
The measures commonly employed at large gatherings differ fundamentally. Closure of large
public spaces for extended periods of time is quite unlike anything that has been upheld under
the ancillary powers doctrine. So too, there is no authoritative ruling at common law upholding
the notion that police may subject large numbers of people to surveillance and search without
cause, erect fences around private property so as to inhibit access, or issue passes permitting only
some people to move freely through public spaces. Figueiras v Toronto (Police Services Board),
a case arising from an incident taking place during the G20 meetings in Toronto, confirms that
lawful police powers must be closely tied to a statutory or regulatory grant of authority and,
correspondingly, that claims to authority grounded on the “ancillary” powers notion are strictly
confined.37
2. Special Police Powers at Inter-Governmental Meetings
Let us return to look more carefully at the federal Foreign Missions Act since it speaks to the
four distinct sorts of needs that arise. The Act provides only a partial bridge over the gaps in
35

36
37

Cloutier was misapplied in interlocutory proceedings in Tremblay c Québec (Procureur général) [2001] JQ no
1504 [Tremblay]. See Diab & Pue, “The Gap in Canadian Police Powers”, supra note 11 at 93–97, and
discussion below. The Tremblay decision is also discussed in Pue, “Trespass and Expressive Rights”, supra note
11 at 8–21. An English translation of the judgment is produced as an appendix to that article.
Dedman, supra note 30 at para 25. Though dissenting in application to the facts, the principles stated here are in
accord with the majority ruling (at 26).
Figueiras v Toronto (Police Services Board), 2015 ONCA 208, especially, paras 61 and 109 (lack of statutory
authority; parameters of common law police powers), 79 and 128 (common law right to liberty), 91 (limits of
powers ancillary to obligation to preserve the peace) (per Rouleau JA, Rensburg JA, and Pardu JA concurring).
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common law police authority. It confers power on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
to use security perimeters in order to protect international conferences but only to the extent
necessary “to ensure the security for the proper functioning of any intergovernmental conference
in which two or more states participate.”38
The statute was passed in the wake of an embarrassing debacle at the Quebec City Summit of
the Americas Conference in 2001.39 Policing measures taken there provoked a near-miss legal
challenge that revealed their insecure legal foundation. In Tremblay c Québec, the applicant
challenged restrictions on his freedom arising from the creation of an extensive exclusion zone.
His application for injunctive relief was heard immediately before the summit’s start. At that late
date, the granting of an injunction would have profoundly disrupted police and security
arrangements, likely derailing the meetings entirely. Hearing the issue in those circumstances, a
court of first instance ruled that extensive security perimeters, searches, and “pass systems” were
permissible even without statutory authority. The ruling skipped lightly over the source of police
authority, rather taking for granted that it flowed somehow from the common law. Despite the
marked divergence from the Canadian norm, there was no careful analysis of precedent
regarding ancillary powers. The learned judge’s decision centred instead on the secondary matter
of whether the exercise of such a power (assuming it to have been prescribed by law) would be
justifiable under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.40 The judge thought so, though
the circumstances of course precluded a full hearing even on that matter.
Despite the final decision, the case illustrated the insecurity of RCMP practices as well as
hinting at awkward questions of jurisdiction between federal and provincial policing authorities.
The government of the day responded by passing amendments to the Foreign Missions Act,
which accorded “primary responsibility” to the RCMP to ensure the security and proper
functioning of certain inter-governmental conferences.41 Its authorization of “controlling,
limiting, or prohibiting access to any area to the extent and in a manner that is reasonable in the
circumstances [section 10.1(2)]” confers seemingly sweeping powers, without further
elaboration.42 Section 10.1(2) combines brevity with vagueness.
Not surprisingly, policing authorities, provincial and municipal governments, and citizens
alike have been left uncertain as to the extent of RCMP authority, the manner in which it should
be exercised, and the division of responsibilities between federal and provincially constituted
police forces. There is no statutory guidance indicating the scope of the powers conferred
(“appropriate measures”) or providing a framework by which to balance the needs of security
against ordinary freedoms (“in a manner that is reasonable in the circumstances”). There is
nothing to guide police as to how extensive their security perimeters should be, how long they
can be established for, or what the requirements may be respecting notice to affected persons. No
criteria are established regarding who should be permitted to cross security perimeters nor the
38
39
40
41
42

Foreign Missions Act, supra note 5.
Tremblay, supra note 35.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
Foreign Missions Act, supra note 5.
Ibid.
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process by which this critical decision should be made. Nothing is said about how to manage
interference with private property and its enjoyment when homes or businesses are caught
behind security fences. There is no indication as to what considerations need to be taken into
account, none as to who should be consulted (if anyone) as part of the decision-making
process.43 The legislation establishes neither high-order principles by which to drive decisions
nor any more specific criteria directing implementation. It is entirely opaque as to the other
things (aside from controlling access to public space) that fall within the general grant of power
to implement “appropriate” measures. The statute gives no indication as to where federal
jurisdiction ends and where the ordinary provincial jurisdiction remains in place. In short, the
statute entirely fails to provide a code for the policing of major events. Its language is too general
and its terms too vague to provide practical guidance.44
3. Policing Geographies: The G20’s Exclusion Zones
The obvious failings of the G20 organization in Toronto provoked a number of official
reviews, which together provide unique insight into how the existing legal frameworks operate in
the real world. A number of challenges were apparent as police forces navigated between federal
and provincial jurisdiction, between police and civil authority, and in the nebula between the
common law and the Foreign Missions Act. The geography of crowd management and security
put in place for the Toronto meetings mapped loosely onto the different types of need previously
identified. Four policing zones were created.

Figure 1: Honorable John W. Morden, Independent Civilian Review into
Matters Relating to the G20 Summit, June 2012, at p 130.
43

44

One effect of Vancouver’s municipal Bylaw 9962, supra note 5, passed prior to the Olympics was to force the
RCMP to work with the city and to give Vancouver’s city police a degree of authority vis-à-vis the RCMP that
they otherwise would have lacked.
The question whether such a provision would survive review under Canada’s constitutional constraints on
statutory vagueness is beyond the point. See R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 SCR 606, for a
statement of Canadian law on constitutional vagueness and the brilliant analysis of this and related
constitutional doctrines provided by Marc Ribeiro, Limiting Arbitrary Power: The Vagueness Doctrine in
Canadian Constitutional Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004).
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The zones were accorded different levels of security and also represented divisions in
authority between Canada’s federal police (event “security’) and the City of Toronto police
(urban policing more generally). Their delineation illuminates the intersection of the common
law and statutory authority of police forces.
A “controlled access zone” formed the highest security area.45 Its boundaries were determined
with the security of delegates and the functioning of the meetings as the driving concerns. It fell
squarely within the ambit of Foreign Missions Act’s policing provisions, which authorized the
security perimeter and accorded primacy to the RCMP. Even without the act, the creation of this
zone would likely have been lawful as an exercise of the “ancillary” police power. The RCMP’s
fence tightly circumscribed private venues in a fashion closely analogous to the Knowlton case.
Assuming only that the owners of the convention centre and the hotel wished to have their
property sealed off from the public in this way and that any ancillary enclosure of public spaces
was minimal, no one would have ground for complaint.46
The second and much larger “restricted access zone” extended roughly 500 metres from north
to south and 300 metres on its east–west axis.47 Private businesses, public thoroughfares, and a
significant amount of public space were put behind police barricades. In this area, the property
rights of a single landowner could not provide a hook on which to hang a Knowlton-like
“ancillary” power. Here, the grant of police powers under the Foreign Missions Act comes into
play, provided that the creation of the zone was necessary “to ensure the security for the proper
functioning” of an inter-governmental conference, “appropriate,” “reasonable in the
circumstances,” and defensible under constitutional protections, including (but not limited to)
those of the Charter.48 Assuming that its boundaries enclosed the minimum area consistent with
the security and “proper functioning” of the conference, it too was both authorized by law and
constitutionally appropriate. Nonetheless, the legislative framework leaves much uncertain. We
do not in fact know, even in general terms, the criteria that the police would apply in establishing
this sort of zone, in deciding how to operate it, or in determining when to grant or refuse entry.
45

46

47

48

“The Controlled Access Zone: This area encompassed the MTCC [Metro Toronto Convention Centre] where
the G20 Summit meetings were held and certain hotels where world leaders stayed during the event. The
Controlled Access Zone was surrounded by a fence on the east, west, and north sides, with cameras monitoring
the railway tracks that were located on the south side. Valid credentials were required to enter the Controlled
Access Zone. The RCMP maintained sole responsibility for security and credentialing with respect to the
Controlled Access Zone.” TPSB Review, supra note 1 at 127–129. For other descriptions of the zones, see
OIPRD Report, supra note 1 at 25.
The courts generally extend wide latitude to owners of private property in determining who can enter their
premises and for what purposes. See eg Harrison v Carswell, [1976] 2 SCR 200, and the helpful discussion of
this case provided in Philip Girard & Jim Phillips, “A Certain ‘Malaise’: Harrison v. Carswell, Shopping Centre
Picketing, and the Limits of the Post-war Settlement” in Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, eds, Work on Trial:
Canadian Labour Law Struggles (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 249 at 249–280.
“The Restricted Access Zone: This was a slightly larger area that surrounded the Controlled Access Zone and
included the rest of the hotels where the world leaders stayed during the event. The Restricted Access Zone was
surrounded by its own fence. The RCMP maintained sole responsibility for security and policing within the
Restricted Access Zone.” TPSB Review, supra note 1 at 127–129. This zone ran north to south from Front Street
to Lakeshore Boulevard and west from John Street to Simcoe Street in the east.
Charter, supra note 40.
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Moreover, there is no statutory provision addressing the needs of those adversely affected or
setting out remedies for them.49
A third area, referred to as the “interdiction zone” was established by the Toronto police. It
covered a larger portion of downtown Toronto, enclosing private residences, businesses, streets,
and other public spaces.50 This makes it unlike either the closure of private space with the
consent of a single property owner (such as Edmonton’s Chateau Lacombe Hotel or the
University of British Columbia’s Vancouver campus or the Metro Toronto Convention Centre)
or restrictions that affect only access to public spaces. Its delineation had adverse effects on the
rights of movement, expression, and assembly for people in general as well as on the privileges
and rights of owners of private property. Such consequences may well fall within the scope of
the Foreign Missions Act’s authorization, but that would be so only to the extent required to
protect the security and function of the conference itself. Both its extent and the initial
assignment of responsibility to the Toronto Police Service suggest that the “interdiction zone”
was not required for the “security” or “functioning” of the meeting, strictly construed, making
the Foreign Missions Act unavailable as a source of police authority.
The area beyond the perimeter fences was referred to by police as the “outer zone.” Policed
by the Toronto Police Service, it “encompassed various areas, including Queen’s Park [the
provincial legislature area], consulates, financial sites, and Toronto Police Service
Headquarters.” Thus, “geographically, the Interdiction Zone fence line became an important
boundary between Toronto and high-security areas in which Internationally Protected Persons
[IPPs] or other Summit delegates were located.”51
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50
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The federal government set up a process following the G20 by which affected businesses in Toronto could seek
compensation for disruptions suffered. See Postmedia News, “Ottawa Agrees to Pay Businesses Nearly $2M in
G8/G20 Compensation”, National Post (15 June 2011), online: <www.nationalpost.com>. According to this
report, “[a]s it has done following international summits in the past, last year the Foreign Affairs Department set
up an ex-gratia payment program to compensate local businesses who lost money because of the security
measures that surrounded the G8 and G20 summits.” The government had set aside $13.45-million for
compensation, but received only “411 claims totalling $11.7-million – $11-million from Toronto businesses
affected by the G20 and $700,000 from Muskoka-area businesses affected by the G8” by the deadline for
applications.
“The Interdiction Zone: This area extended in all directions beyond the Restricted Access Zone perimeter fence
and surrounded the Restricted Access Zone and Controlled Access Zone. … The Interdiction Zone was
surrounded by approximately 3.8 kilometres of chain link fencing that, when atop concrete barriers, had a
height of almost ten feet. Toronto residents who obtained security approval before the G20 Summit would have
to show their approval document at a gate on the Interdiction Zone fence in order to be permitted entry into this
zone. The Interdiction Zone also included the PATH system in Toronto that runs underground and connects
certain buildings in the downtown core. The Toronto Police Service was responsible for the security and
credentialing at the Interdiction Zone fence.” The following are within the boundaries of the interdiction zone as
reported in the TPSB Review, supra note 1: condominiums at 30 Grand Trunk Crescent (just off Bremner Blvd.)
and two condominium buildings at the “Maple Leaf Square Condominiums” on York Street south of Bremner
Blvd.
TPSB Review, supra note 1 at 129.
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B. Establishing Legal Foundations at the G20 Summit and Vancouver Olympics
Since neither the common law nor the Foreign Missions Act provide authority for the full
repertoire of policing measures needed, ad hoc arrangements were pieced together in both
Toronto and Vancouver. In one case, a long-forgotten statute (itself surprisingly vague) was
resurrected to provide lawful authority for police barricades beyond the “controlled access” and
“restricted access” zones; in the other, a city bylaw filled the void.
1. G20 Summit: Inter-Agency Confusion Regarding Police Powers
Confusion arose at the G20 Summit as city police and the RCMP navigated the borderlands
between federal and provincial jurisdiction. While the Foreign Missions Act gave the RCMP
“primary responsibility” over security for the conference,52 Toronto’s police retained authority
over most of the city. Straight-forward though that may seem, devils lurk in the details. Practical
matters such as exactly how, when, and where the RCMP or Toronto Police Service’s command
structures would prevail proved a source of continuing confusion. One review found that
“[d]uring the planning process, the Toronto Police Service struggled to understand its role,
planning responsibilities and the legal authority on which it would act in respect of certain G20
Summit issues.”53 Although Ontario’s Provincial Police [OPP] believed their exclusion zone
around meetings in Huntsville was authorized by common law,54 Toronto’s Police Service
remained uncertain of its authority to construct any security perimeter other than those flowing
from the RCMP’s statutory authority.55
Several efforts were made to redress this lacuna. Under section 10.1(4) of the Foreign
Missions Act, the federal government is authorized to enter into an arrangement with a provincial
government for the provision of security at inter-governmental conferences.56 Ontario’s Ministry
of Community Safety sought an “arrangement” with the federal government in the hope that this
would extend the act’s powers to local and regional police forces.57 Both the Toronto Police
Service and the City of Toronto were simultaneously engaged in discussions with the federal
ministry and with the RCMP toward the same end.58 The federal government balked, Federal
Deputy Minister of Public Safety William V. Baker telling his provincial counterpart that such
an arrangement was “not required for the Summits as it would not grant further authorities to
local police of jurisdiction” [sic]. He had also expressed his belief that “the current suite of
52
53
54

55
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57
58

Foreign Missions Act, supra note 5; see also Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 2 [Criminal Code]:
“[I]nternationally protected persons.”
TPSB Review, supra note 1 at 124.
Ibid. The security perimeter the OPP erected at Huntsville was eight kilometres long and fenced in a “few
hundred” residents. People who lived or worked within the zone were to receive accreditation passes five days
before the G8 began. See Jennifer Yang, “G8 Brings Trepidation in Huntsville”, Toronto Star (21 May 2010),
online: <www.thestar.com>. The OPP reported subsequently that its “Interdiction Zone … encompassed an area
of approximately fourteen square kilometres, and included nearly 1000 residents.” OPP, supra note 1 at 6. Julio
Fantino was then Ontario provincial police commissioner.
OIPRD Report, supra note 1 at 28.
Foreign Missions Act, supra note 5, s 10.1(4).
See McMurtry, supra note 1 at Appendix 6.
Ombudsman’s Report, supra note 1 at 51.

198

Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice

2015

powers and authorities [sic] that peace officers possess at common law or by virtue of any other
federal or provincial Act or regulation were sufficient.”59 Although mistaken regarding the
common law powers of the OPP, the federal ministry was probably correct that the
“arrangements” contemplated by the Foreign Missions Act legislation were unavailable for the
purposes sought. The view that the broad powers to employ the “appropriate measures”
contemplated in section 10.1(2) were exclusive to the RCMP, and could not be delegated to other
forces, is plausible. Section 10.1(4) allows for “arrangements” only “to facilitate consultation
and cooperation,” while section 10.1(2) explicitly confers on the RCMP the power to take
“appropriate measures.”60
The federal government’s misunderstanding of the general law of police powers was shared
by senior RCMP officials (no surprise as they have no way of obtaining independent legal
advice). Commissioner Alphonse MacNeil mistakenly thought that “common law provisions and
general police practices would have supported the [Toronto Police Service] in the delivery of
their security operation in Toronto.”61 The RCMP also declined to designate Toronto police
officers as special constables under the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act in order to bring
them under the Foreign Missions Act.62 However, even this would have left the critical question
of the spatial extent of the special federal policing power unresolved, for not everything turns on
the colour of the uniform worn. How deep into an urban area and how far away from delegates
or conference facilities the federal power extends is unclear. Whether this power is exercised
directly by regular RCMP officers or by special constables is a second-order question.
The legal geography of public order policing raises puzzling questions about the G20 Summit
zones. If the international conference triggered a need for the most massive security perimeters
encompassing the interdiction, restricted access, and controlled access zones, in order “to ensure
the security for the proper functioning” of the G20 Summits, the RCMP should have created the
larger security perimeter directly and under their own command. In this case, there would have
been no need to rely upon patched-together arrangements with local authorities, whether by
means of the appointment of special constables or otherwise. If the RCMP simply needed more
personnel to guard their security perimeters, the appointment of city police as special constables
would likely have done the trick. However, if the larger security perimeter was not necessary for
the purposes set out in the statute, as seems likely (as opposed to, say, being needed to manage
crowds or traffic safely or in order to facilitate protests that were unlikely to disrupt the
conference), then reliance upon the Foreign Missions Act’s precisely limited powers would have
59
60
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McMurtry, supra note 1 at Appendix 7.
The section in full reads: “For the purpose of carrying out its responsibility under subsection (1) [i.e., primary
responsibility for conference security], the Royal Canadian Mounted Police may take appropriate measures,
including controlling, limiting or prohibiting access to any area to the extent and in a manner that is reasonable
in the circumstances.” The Ontario Ombudsman’s Report observes that the federal act does not and cannot
confer police powers upon provincially constituted police officers and reports that federal lawyers took the view
that no “arrangement” entered into with a province could have this effect. Ombudsman’s Report, supra note 1 at
50–51, para 117.
OIPRD Report, supra note 1 at 28.
Ibid. Special constables can be appointed under section 7(1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, RSC
1985, c R-10 [RCMP Act].

Vol. 32 (2)

The Policing of Major Events in Canada

199

been improper. The Act’s wording focuses on the safety of delegates at a conference, not on the
regular provincial and municipal responsibilities to ensure traffic flows and the safety and wellbeing of those on adjacent or distant city streets.
Officials at the provincial Ministry of Community Safety, the City of Toronto, and the
Toronto Police Service actively sought other possible sources of legislative authority.63 Chief
Bill Blair explained that the intention was to seek authority beyond that available under the
Foreign Missions Act.64 A lawyer at the Ministry of Community Safety proposed filling the gap
by means of Ontario’s PWPA.65 Lawful authority for an exclusion zone could be created under
the act by designating the proposed area – streets, buildings, and land – “public works.”66 Passed
as an emergency measure at the start of the Second World War, the PWPA authorized police to
stop anyone from attempting to enter a public work, to demand proof of identity, and to carry out
searches without cause.67 It gave police officers unfettered discretion to refuse entry and also to
use necessary force.68 However, it went even further. In the case of a dispute over the boundaries
of a public work, an officer’s sworn testimony on the point was to be taken as conclusive
evidence.69 The act made it an offence to refuse to comply with a request or direction made
under it and put the onus on the accused to establish lawful excuse.70
On the advice of counsel for the City of Toronto and the Toronto Police Service, Chief Blair
asked the ministry to enact a regulation designating the boundaries of the (Toronto Police
Service’s) interdiction zone as a “public work.”71 Chief Blair sought the designation in order to
buttress police authority for the creation of an exclusion zone and for the associated powers of
detention and search on behalf of the Toronto Police Service and the Integrated Security Unit
[ISU] generally.72 The OPP, RCMP, and Public Safety Canada were aware of the request.73 His
request was made on 12 May, the regulation invoked on 3 June, filed with the registrar on 14
June, and posted on the province’s “e-laws” website on 16 June, just ten days before the
conference was to begin.74 This website is not widely read (to say the least). In what proved a
stunning misstep, the provincial ministry decided to be “low-key and reactive” in invoking the
law, rather than actively seeking to inform the public about it.75
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TPSB Review, supra note 1 at 287.
Ibid.
PWPA, supra note 5 at 14; TPSB Review, supra note 1 at 288 (the email described the act as “the legislation that
allows for control of access to public areas – buildings and the like”).
TPSB Review, supra note 1; Ombudsman’s Report, supra note 1.
PWPA, supra note 5; for further context on the Act, see OIPRD Report, supra note 1 at 28.
PWPA, supra note 5, s 3(c).
Ibid, s 4.
Ibid, s 5.
Ombudsman’s Report, supra note 1 at 52. With respect to the timing of the pursuit of legislative support, the
TPSB Review, supra note 1 at 287: “[T]he PWPA was being considered before the Government of Canada’s
letter was received by the Toronto Police Service on June 11, 2010 and was resorted to not simply because the
federal government declined to enter into an FMIOA arrangement.”
McMurtry, supra note 1 at Appendix 3; see also at 2.
Ombudsman’s Report, supra note 1 at 57.
Ibid at 64.
Ibid at 57.
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The result was to bring into force coercive law that was in effect kept secret from members of
the public who were expected to obey it. This elementary blunder spawned confusion among
officials, attached the taint of secret laws to the effort to ensure that police acted with lawful
authority, and inhibited efforts to train police officers properly in its application. Ontario’s
ombudsman concluded that responsibility for failure to inform the public about the invocation of
the wartime legislation lay mostly with the province. It was surprising, he thought, that although
the invocation of the PWPA “affected a large segment of downtown Toronto, the Ministry made
no attempt to consult city officials about the impact of the public works designation.”76 The same
point registers, a fortiori, with respect to the exercise of similar police power employed in
identical fashion without the cover of statute. Civil authority was diminished as police agencies
took charge.
Surprisingly, Toronto’s chief of police remained unaware of the new regulations until the day
before the G20 Summit was to begin (25 June). Like almost everyone else, he learned about it
through the media after the first arrest for violation of the regulations.77 Nobody had thought to
inform Chief Blair that the regulation had come into effect, and he learned only that morning that
some of his officers were acting under its authority, as they understood it.78 A worst case
scenario emerged as police officers exercised authority they did not understand: some exceeded
the letter of the law as well as the intent of those who had requested and enacted the regulation. It
was a mess.
Toronto’s media found it exciting that a “war time” regulation was in play and focused
attention on the scope and validity of powers exercised under the regulations. Chief Blair
compounded confusion by mistakenly asserting that powers to search and question under the
PWPA extended five metres outward from the interdiction zone’s fence.79 Although the chief
subsequently sent clarification to officers, 80 no public correction was issued.81 Communications
failed within the force, and “some officers continued to apply the Act well beyond the perimeter
even after the scope of Regulation 233/10 had been clarified.”82 At a post-G20 Summit press
conference, Blair admitted there was not in fact a five-metre rule but explained that he “wanted
to keep the criminals out.”
76
77
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Ibid at 62, para 155.
Ombudsman’s Report, supra note 1; OIPRD Report, supra note 1 at 88.
Ombudsman’s Report, supra note 1, at 72 (official notification from the minister had been received on 15 June).
In any event, front line police officers were acting as if they enjoyed legal authority equivalent to that conveyed
under the regulations).
Ibid at 67.
Ibid at 68. Yet some in the ministry were also caught in the fog. As the ombudsman notes, “[w]hile the
regulation was intended to provide “clarity,” we found that Ministry officials did not share a uniform
understanding of what it actually accomplished. Some were under the impression that the regulation designated
the entire exterior security fence as the “public work,” while others indicated that it was the whole area within
the fence, and still others explained that it pertained only to a few specific places in the security perimeter which
would not otherwise have been subject to the Act” (at 59).
Ibid at 71.
Ibid at 72. Blair subsequently explained his failure to make a public correction on the grounds that he “wanted
to keep the criminals out” (at 88).
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In a post-event Review of the Public Works Protection Act, which was prepared for the
Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, former Ontario Chief Justice Roy
McMurtry concluded that the PWPA was constitutionally doubtful.83 Its definition of “public
work” was “extraordinarily broad,” he said, raising “questions of overbreadth” and giving cause
for concern “from a policy standpoint” (as well, one might think, as creating vulnerability for
vagueness or overbreadth under sections 7 and 1 of the Charter).84 He viewed a provision
allowing officers to stop and question persons entering a public work, or on their “approach
thereto” (section 3(a)), as vague to a point approaching unconstitutionality, raising the likelihood
that any detention or search pursuant to this provision would be unlawful.85 He considered the
lack of clarity particularly troubling given the possibility of a prosecution under section 5.86 The
fact that conviction leading to imprisonment could result from the application of a reverse onus
was, McMurtry thought, a violation of section 11(d) (presumption of innocence) of the Charter,
which was unlikely to be saved by application of the “rational connection test” under section 1.87
Curiously, given that a review of federal legislation was not within his terms of reference,
McMurtry remarked positively on the similarly vague provisions of the Foreign Missions Act.88
The province’s Public Works Act was repealed in its entirety in 2015 without new legislation
being introduced to govern the exercise of police authority at large events not related to court
proceedings or electricity-generating facilities.89
2. A Loss of Transparency and Accountability
In planning for the G20 Summit, agencies worked together behind the scenes in an ISU
overseen by a Steering Committee under the leadership of the RCMP.90 Both transparency and
accountability were compromised as matters of practical importance, including the extent,
duration, and location of security perimeters, and the requirements for passage through them
were determined in closed meetings without the benefit of statutory guidance. The public, who
was expected to comply with expectations established by police in this way obtained only partial
(sometimes false91) information, often communicated late in the day. Invariably, some found
83
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McMurtry, supra note 1.
Charter, supra note 40; McMurtry, supra note 1 at 18.
McMurtry, supra note 1 at 40. McMurtry seemed unperturbed by the even greater vagueness and uncertainty
arising from measures taken by police without statutory authorization. His brief discussion of this point does not
provide an analysis of the common law and its limits (at 23–26). See, however, Diab & Pue, “The Gap in
Canadian Police Powers”, supra note 11; Pue, “Trespass and Expressive Rights”, supra note 11; Stribopoulos,
“The Rule of Law on Trial, supra note 9.
McMurtry, supra note 1 at 19.
Ibid at 44. Section 1 of the Charter, supra note 40 provides: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” On the constitutional validity of the PWPA, see also
Roach, supra note 19 at 67–69.
McMurtry, supra note 1 at 27–30.
Security for Courts, Electricity Generating Facilities and Nuclear Facilities Act, 2014, SO 2014, c 15, Schedule
1, s 1.
See OIPRD Report, supra note 1 at 20–43.
Ombudsman’s Report, supra note 1 at 67.
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themselves unable to comply with police expectations that were not made known to them.
Confusion extended to front-line police officers. The impact on residents, homeowners, business
enterprises, people going about their daily work, as well as on lawful protesters, was significant.
None had an opportunity to provide input; few were fully informed as to how they would be
affected. No mechanism existed by which to remedy the harms suffered.
Failures of communication flowed both from the inadequate statutory frameworks and from
the provincial ministry’s unfortunate decision to conceal the invocation of the Public Works Act,
amplifying problems. Many important matters were managed entirely within the police force’s
discretion: application procedures, eligibility, verification of identity, the databases that police
would create or use, weaponry to be employed in summit policing, appeals of adverse decisions
made by police officials, and the consequences of failure to apply (through inadvertence or
otherwise) – all were determined by police as if they were mere office procedures.92
Media relations personnel from the various police agencies, working as the ISU’s “G8-G20
Public Affairs Communications Team,” were tasked with maintaining content for the ISU’s
website and liaising with interested stakeholders.93 Despite the obvious importance of road
closures, the location of security perimeters, the availability of police “passes” for those wishing
to traverse Toronto’s streets, information about such matters was made available only late in the
planning process, if at all.94
In summary, the extensive and in-depth official reviews of the G20 Summit events reveal
much about the interpretation of law by the officials most directly charged with this task. It
seems clear that federal authorities believe that the creation of security perimeters established by
local police solely for the purpose of ensuring public safety and managing pedestrian and traffic
flow in the vicinity of an international conference lies outside of the Foreign Missions Act’s
ambit. This view, almost certainly correct, casts in stark relief the absence of legislative authority
for the perimeters that may be needed because an international conference is taking place but that
are not essential to its functioning. The late date on which the public learns the location of
policed perimeters means that tests of their legality before the courts come either at the very last
moment as ex parte brinksmanship (as in Tremblay) or ex post facto, when the issue is moot.
This timing very nearly inoculates against judicial review. Power exercised without legislative
92
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See W. Pue, “Analysis of Police Provisions in Bill C 35: An Act to Amend the Foreign Missions and
International Organizations Act,” Testimony, House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, Tuesday, 6 November 2001 (on file with the author). Such concerns were, indeed, raised in
Parliament as the amendments went through. See eg House of Commons Debates, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, No 116 (21
November 2001) at 7397 (Francine Lalonde); House of Commons Debatesw, 37th Parl, 1st Sess, No 117 (22
November 2001) at 7416 (Svend Robinson).
CPC Report, supra note 1 at 23.
A “statement of concerns” published 21 May 2010 by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association suggests that by
that point in time, the size of the zones had not been made public. “Protecting Civil Liberties and Human Rights
at the G20: Statement of Concerns”, online: <http://ccla.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/G20CCLA-Statement-of-Concerns.pdf> at 4. See also Canadian Civil Liberties Association, letter to Toronto Police
Chief William Blair and RCMP Commissioner William Elliott (4 June 2010), both texts are found in the
Appendix to “Breach of the Peace”, supra note 1 at appendix; Siri Agrell, “Pass Will Get Locals Past Outer
Security Perimeter for G20 Summit”, Globe and Mail (30 April 2010), online: <www.globeandmail.com>.
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guidance, even as to the governing principles, and exercised most often without legislative
authority, is more or less immunized from court challenge.
C. Inter-Agency Policing at the Vancouver Olympics
Vancouver’s Olympics worked out very differently. As sporting events are not, on the face of
it, “inter-governmental conferences,” the Foreign Mission Act’s police powers seem unavailable.
Just as at international conferences, crowd and traffic management for very large numbers of
people were needed at locations that were far enough from Olympic sites as to have no direct
effect on security of events, athletes, or Olympic personnel. Things worked better in Vancouver,
no doubt, partly because authorities had considerably longer to prepare. The importance of this
fact can scarcely be overemphasized. Other material differences were at play too. Vancouver’s
geography is not Toronto’s, the configuration of its public spaces is unlike those in the vicinity
of Toronto’s G20 Summit sites. Sporting events attract a different sort of protester than G20
Summits, and British Columbia may have fewer self-declared “anarchists” organized for the
purpose of vandalism or worse. Toronto is part of a much larger conurbation than the lower
mainland (the metropolitan Vancouver area) and nearer to many large population centres both in
Canada and in the United States, making it easier for committed protesters or simple
troublemakers to travel to the city from elsewhere. It may be that the police themselves imagined
the two events in quite different ways. Moreover, the influence of foreign security forces on
Canadian policing at meetings where heads of government from around the world are present can
be immense, and we do not know how these conditioned what played out in Toronto.
Nonetheless, the challenges of managing, policing, and ensuring the security of the Olympics
were enormous.95 In Vancouver, the legal gaps were filled by a municipal bylaw.
The RCMP operates as a federal police force in British Columbia, just as it does elsewhere in
Canada. In British Columbia, unlike Ontario, they also serve under contract as provincial police
and, in many municipalities (though, critically, not Vancouver) as municipal police.96
Vancouver’s Olympics bid and subsequent selection caused agreements to be entered into
between the province and federal government, the organizing committees and municipalities,
setting out the responsibilities of the parties, including those relating to police and security.97
95

96
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No one involved in Olympic security can overlook the symbolic importance of the games and all will be
mindful of terrorist attacks in 1972. See David Binder, “9 Israelis on Olympic Team Killed with 4 Arab Captors
as Police Fight Band That Disrupted Munich Games”, New York Times (6 September 1972), online:
<www.nytimes.com>.
See Police Act, RSBC 1996, c 367, s 3; RCMP Act, supra note 62, s 20; Government of British Columbia,
“Province of British Columbia Provincial Police Service Agreement” (April 1992), online:
<www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/policeservices/shareddocs/police-agreement-provincial.pdf>. Some larger cities have
their own municipal forces (such as Vancouver, Delta, or Abbottsford, but not Richmond, Surrey, Kelowna, or
New Westminster, for example). The extent to which RCMP officers working at or near Olympic venues at the
University of British Columbia, Richmond, or Whistler understood their differentiated roles as federal and
municipal police officers is unclear; so too the manner in which their internal organizational structures
navigated this terrain.
See eg Agreement between Canada, British Columbia, Vancouver, Whistler, the Canadian Olympic Committee,
the Canadian Paralympic Committee, and the Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation (14 November 2002), online:
<www.canada2010.gc.ca/role/gc/mpa/MPA-e.PDF> [Multi-Party Agreement]; 2010 Olympic Games and
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Canada and British Columbia were to provide their normal policing and security services, subject
to cost-sharing arrangements. The RCMP would “(1) [take] the lead in forming an integrated
police planning group, (2) appropriate federal security measures which in the opinion of Canada
are necessary, and (3) … cooperate with [many] Games parties on non-federal security
matters.”98
Much of the detailed implementation was fleshed out subsequently between the RCMP and
the Vancouver Police Department [VPD].99 An ISU and other inter-agency mechanisms were
created. A relatively clear demarcation of jurisdiction between the RCMP and the VPD (“nonfederal security matters”) emerged early: the VPD would maintain jurisdiction over the city of
Vancouver, while the RCMP would assume “lead authority” over the “games security area” (that
is, venues and the spaces surrounding them).100 This directly tracked the responsibility of the
federal government for international affairs and was analogous to the division of policing spaces
at an international conference. In Vancouver, as in Toronto, the scope of police powers required
elaboration. A legal foundation was needed to confer necessary authority on one or other police
force, to clarify responsibility as between jurisdictions, and to ensure the safe and efficient
movement of massive numbers of people facilitated by means that might include street closures,
issuance of passes, and searches without cause.
As in Toronto, uncertainty as to the legal authority for crowd management measures was
unacceptable. In stark contrast to Ontario’s preference for secrecy, British Columbia addressed
the matter in a clear and public fashion. The City of Vancouver sought amendment of its
enabling legislation, the Vancouver Charter, to “add to or clarify Council’s powers of regulation”
with regard to the Winter Olympics.101 It asked for authority to pass bylaws providing for
temporary street closures, the regulation of advertising and signage on streets and in parks, and
relaxing building and zoning requirements. New powers were also requested to regulate signage
on private property, including authority to remove graffiti or signs on limited notice. An increase
in the maximum fine for a bylaw offence to $10,000 was sought.102
The provincial government tabled Bill 13, the Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act in
response,103 but Vancouver City Council enacted an omnibus “2010 Olympic and Paralympic
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Paralympic Games Security Cost Sharing Memorandum of Agreement (8 December 2006), online:
<www.canada2010.gc.ca/docs/moa-eng.pdf> [Cost Sharing Memorandum of Agreement].
Multi-Party Agreement, ibid at 34 (Part 2).
Cost Sharing Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 97.
2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games Security Agreement between Canada and British Columbia (21
January 2009), online: <www.fin.gov.bc.ca/reports/Ministers_MOA.pdf>.
Vancouver Charter, SBC 1953, c 55.
General Manager of Olympic and Paralympic Operations and Director of Legal Services, “2010 Olympic and
Paralympic Winter Games: Vancouver Charter Amendment Proposals”, City of Vancouver Administrative
Report RTS No 7680, Van RIMS No 08-2000-20 (17 December 2008), online: <http://vancouver.ca/ctyclerk/cclerk/20090120/documents/a8.pdf>. The powers were granted in Bill 13, Miscellaneous Statutes
Amendment Act, 2009, 1st Sess, 39th Leg, British Columbia, 2009 [Bill 13]. See also Bylaw no 9697 on 2010
Winter Games Sign Designation and Relaxation Bylaw (8 July 2008); Bylaw no 9908 on 2010 Olympic and
Paralympic Winter Games Bylaw (23 July 2009), [Bylaw 9908]; Bylaw 9962, supra note 5.
Bill 13, ibid.
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Winter Games bylaw” before the bill passed.104 This would have authorized closure or restricted
access to streets and other public spaces,105 the use of airport-style security checkpoints,106
warrantless searches of persons and belongings without “reasonable cause,”107 video
surveillance,108 and restrictions on the use of signs,109 megaphones,110 and other methods of
expression.111 Fines were set at $2,000 for each offence and $50 per day for continuing
offences.112 An exception to the prohibition on signage that would have allowed any sign “that
celebrates the 2010 Winter Games, and creates or enhances a festive environment and
atmosphere” was widely viewed as tilting too far towards censorship.113
The city denied any intent to “impact on freedom of political expression or the right to lawful
protest,”114 defending restrictions on non-celebratory signs as a necessary protection for Olympic
advertising and sponsorship arrangements.115 Two private citizens who viewed the bylaw as ultra
vires the city and a violation of sections 2 (freedom of expression) and 7 (life, liberty, and
security of the person) of the Charter initiated a court challenge.116 They viewed the failure to
specify the prohibited “advertising material”117 as a critical rights infringement and believed a
provision authorizing the city manager to make additional rules was both overbroad and too
vague.118 On the face of it, other provisions, including prohibitions on bringing sticks or
megaphones into designated sites, vague prohibitions on the “interfer[ence] with the enjoyment”
of others, and new authority for search without cause, erection of security fences, and
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Passage of the bylaw prior to the enactment of Bill 13 raised obvious questions as to its lawfulness.
Bylaw 9908, supra note 102, ss 10, 4B, 4D. See also City of Vancouver, “Supports Item No 4, CS&B
Committee Agenda”, Administrative Report (23 July 2009), online: <http://former.vancouver.ca/ctyclerk/cclerk/20090723/documents/csbu4.pdf>.
Bylaw 9908, supra note 102, s 4C(a).
Ibid, s 4C(c).
Ibid, s 4C(b).
Ibid, ss 4B(d), 8, 9, 10.1(8), 10.1(11)(b), 10.1(14)(a).
Ibid, s 4B(a)(iv).
Ibid, ss 4B(b), (d).
Ibid, ss 14.4–14.5.
Ibid, ss 1.2, 8.3.
General Manager of Olympic and Paralympic Operations, “2010 Winter Games Bylaw Regarding the
Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games”, City of Vancouver Administrative Report RTS No
08199, Van RIMS No: 08-2000-20 (6 July 2009) at 3 and 6, online: <http://vancouver.ca/ctyclerk/cclerk/20090723/documents/csbu4.pdf>.
The bylaw’s terms, however, did not preclude that possibility. British Columbia, Legislative Assembly,
Hansard, 1st Sess, 39th Parl, Vol 4, No 7 (19 October 2009) at 1233 (Mike Farnworth): “[I]n the public out there,
these particular sections of this particular bill are already referred to as the jackboot clause … because it is so
broad in its definition. … That is exactly what is wrong – the fact that this is so broad and is so vague.”
Charter, supra note 40; Shaw and Westergaard Thorpe v City of Vancouver, Court File no S-097345, Statement
of Claim, filed in the Supreme Court of British Columbia (7 October 2009), online: <http://bccla.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/2009-BCCLA-Letter-Shaw-Statement.pdf>.
Bylaw 9908, supra note 102, ss 4B(d), 10.1.
Ibid s 4D: “[T]he City Manager may make additional rules concerning city land, and may post those rules at the
entrance to city land.”
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surveillance measures) may also have been vulnerable as ultra vires a municipality or otherwise
unconstitutional.119
When Bill 13 came forward in the provincial legislature,120 debate centred on freedom of
speech and on the ability to post signs at one’s home without interference.121 Opposition
members expressed concern about the motivations behind the bill and about vagueness,
overbreadth, and lack of transparency.122 Passed unamended, the bill came into force on 29
October 2009.123 The new legislation clarified the city’s jurisdiction. The city removed doubt as
to vires and buttressed against Charter challenge by substituting a new version of its earlier
bylaw on 3 December 2009.124 This covered much the same ground, imposing restrictions on
commercial speech125 and authorizing closure of public areas and streets.126 Airport-style
security checkpoints were authorized at entrances to “city live sites.”127 The new version
permitted warrantless searches of persons and their belongings (that is, without “reasonable
cause”),128 authorized surveillance,129 and restricted freedom of expression (including by means
of signs, megaphones, or other means).130 Some of the rough edges of the previous iteration were
buffed off. A prohibition on protest within a forty-block radius of downtown Vancouver was
abandoned,131 and restrictions on signage were more precisely focused on commercial
messages.132
The legal challenge was abandoned after these changes were made,133 with the result that the
constitutionality of the bylaw was never tested in court. Nonetheless, the first requirement for the
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Ibid ss. 4, 13.3(e). For further context surrounding the litigation, see Megan Stewart & Linda Solomon, “BC
Civil Liberties Association Files Suit against City of Vancouver for Olympics Speech Restriction Bylaw”,
Vancouver Observer (7 October 2009), online: <www.vancouverobserver.com>.
In particular, Bill 13, supra note 102, Part 9, which proposed an addition to the Municipalities Enabling and
Validating Act (No. 3), SBC 2001, c 44, in addition to amendments to the Vancouver Charter, supra note 101.
British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 5, No 4 (22 October 2009) at 1427–
1430 [Hansard, No. 4]; British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 5, No 3 (21
October 2009) at 1381–1397 [Hansard, No. 3].
Hansard, No. 3, ibid at 1385 (Leonard Krog).
Hansard, No. 4, supra note 121 at 1429. There is no record of consideration having been given to proceeding by
means of provincial statute or regulation rather than bylaw and no consideration appears to have been given to
the governance of Olympic sites outside of the city of Vancouver.
Bylaw 9962, supra note 5; Rod Mickleburgh, “Vancouver Dumps Bylaw Derided by Activists as ‘Beijing 2.0’”,
Globe and Mail (27 November 2009), online: <www.globeandmail.com>; and Bob Mackin, “Council Bows to
Pressure”, 24 Hours Vancouver (27 November 2009), online <Vancouver.24hrs.ca>.
Bylaw 9962, supra note 5, s 10(7)–(9).
Ibid, s 10.
Ibid, s 4B(a).
Ibid, s 4B(c).
Ibid, s 4B(b).
Ibid, ss 4A(a)(ii), 4A(d), 8, 9, 10, 4A(iv), 4A(c)–(d).
Gery Bellett, “Anti-Games Activists Drop Suit over Bylaws Restricting Protests”, Vancouver Sun (26 January
2010), online: <www.vancouversun.com>.
See eg Bylaw 9962, supra note 5, s 10.
Bellett, supra note 131. Bellett notes that applicant Chris Shaw estimated 80 percent of their requests had been
met; and David Eby, for the BC Civil Liberties Association, expressed the view that most contentious parts of
the bylaw, limiting forms of protest in certain areas, had been rescinded.
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lawful exercise of powers by police – that it be “authorized by law” – was met. Moreover, no
taint of “secrecy” attached to the bylaw. Amendments to the Vancouver Charter had gone
through the ordinary legislative process, and each version of the city bylaw was passed in the
normal way during regular Council meetings. The new laws and arrangements flowing from
them were well known.
Other aspects of large-scale event planning went smoothly, and no arrests were made for
contravention of the bylaw. Although the public at large had little direct input as to when or
where street closures, checkpoints, and so on were put in place, those actions were determined by
their elected representatives through the ordinary processes, and information was communicated
to the widest possible public. Outside of Vancouver, closure of the main highway connecting
Vancouver to Whistler (approximately 129 kilometres) and other road closures were brought
about through the ordinary public processes of municipal councils and provincial ministries as
appropriate.134 Throughout, Vancouver Organizing Committee “engaged with stakeholders on
matters such as transportation planning,” including collaboration with “government partners and
industry via an Olympic and Paralympic Transportation Team [OPTT].”135
Over 900 surveillance cameras were used in Vancouver.136 The two “City Live” sites were
fenced off and access filtered through airport-style security screening.137 Other places normally
open to the public, such as the plaza containing the Olympic flame, were fenced off entirely.138 A
134
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See Motor Vehicle Act, RSBC 1996, c 318, ss 124, 197; Vancouver Charter, supra note 101, s 317 (authority to
pass bylaws regulating traffic); and Transportation Act, SBC 2004 c 44, s 61 (allowing the minister to close
highways temporarily). See also “Vancouver 2010 Candidate City”, online: <www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_706.pdf>. The Olympic and Paralympic Transportation Team released the Host
City Transportation Plan in three phases: the first phase was set out in March 2009 in the Vancouver Olympic
Committee’s “Sustainability Report 2009–10”, online: <http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Games_Vancouver_2010/VANOC_Sustainability_Report-EN.pdf> at 66; Phase 2 was released on 14
October 2009 in the form of information set out on a webpage hosted by Translink BC, online:
<http://buzzer.translink.ca/index.php/2009/10/phase-two-of-the-2010-olympic-transportation-plan-releasedtoday/>; and phase 3, which was titled the “Travelsmart 2010 Update: Start Planning to Leave Vehicles Behind
for 2010 Winter Games Opening and Closing Ceremonies,” and outlined temporary street closures, was released
in January 2010. (The site is no longer available, but its content was summarized in a Canada news wire posting
on 12 January 2010, online: <www.newswire.ca/en/story/712299/travelsmart-2010-update-start-planning-toleave-vehicles-behind-for-2010-winter-games-opening-and-closing-ceremonies>).
Sustainability Report 2009–10, ibid at 15, 66. Although now removed, “Travelsmart 2010”, ibid, and the
Integrated Security Unit’s site <www.v2010isu.com> were examples. See also Security Intelligence Review
Committee, “Security at the Olympic Venues: What to Expect” (1 February 2010), online:
<www.sirc.ca/news_view.cfm?id=33676>. Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit, Twitter feed (8 June
2010–22 October 2010), online: <https://twitter.com/v2010isu>. Facebook, Groupe integré de la sécurité de
Vancouver 2010, online: <www.facebook.com/pages/Groupe-intégré-de-la-sécurité-de-Vancouver2010/185197474367>; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “2010 Guide: Map of Venues, Celebrations,
Pavilions, Free Events, Transit and Road Closures during the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic
Games” (10 March 2010), online: <www.cbc.ca/bc/features/roadtothegames/features/olympic-venues-eventstransportation/>.
Molnar & Snider, supra note 1.
Bylaw 9962, supra note 5, Schedule A.
Associated Press, “Better Views of Olympic Flame on the Way”, NBC News (16 February 2010), online
<www.nbcnews.com>. Vancouver Organizing Committee’s Renee Smith-Valade asserted that the Olympic
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number of Vancouver locations designated as “venues” were subjected to noise, sign, and other
restrictions.139 Streets surrounding venues (“venue corridors”) were closed to drivers.140
There is always room for disagreement on particulars, such as the precise boundaries of
security perimeters, each restriction on movement and assembly, the extent of video surveillance,
the appropriateness of warrantless searches, and the restrictions on signage. Careful, detailed,
and specific analysis of each measure and of each boundary on the ground would be required to
determine their desirability, wisdom, and constitutionality. The substantial public interest in
securing safety where very large numbers gather militates in favour of some such measures
derived from proper provenance, authorized by law, carefully drafted, and enforced with
integrity. Whatever failings might attach to the particular provisions, the process was public,
visible, and pursued through the ordinary channels. In a city where the memory of the previous
decade’s Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation affair was still strong,141 Vancouver’s media were
well informed on the issues and on official actions. The local activist community was relatively
vocal, and an independent Civil Liberties Advisory Council published a report of
recommendations.142
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A side-by-side comparison of the two events shows that Vancouver got much “right” at the
2010 Olympics, just as much went wrong at Toronto’s G20 Summit. Three conclusions can be
drawn regarding legal arrangements for each event. First, the ongoing gap in the authority of
police and civic officials with respect to implementing measures to manage very large events
needs to be resolved. A significant legal lacuna lies in the space between the RCMP’s security
jurisdiction under the Foreign Missions Act, common law police powers, and the authority of
local governments. The spatial reach, scale, and duration of major events distinguish them from
other events, revealing a substantial fissure between the security perimeter provisions in this Act
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and ordinarily ancillary police powers. The practical difficulties arising are all too apparent from
the history of official efforts to navigate this no-man’s land in the planning for the G20 meetings.
Second, the two events clarify that the categories of “security,” “public order,” and the right
to protest are not exhaustive of what needs to be taken into account as officials plan, manage,
and police very large events. Important considerations respecting traffic flow for vehicles and
pedestrians, public safety, business continuity, enjoyment of property, and the rights of
association, movement, and expression are not subsumed under the simpler notion of police
authority. The mechanisms employed in balancing competing interests such as these resonate
more closely with municipal government functions (such as zoning, land use regulation,
management of public spaces, and traffic planning) than with ordinary policing functions.
Third, a comparison of the two events reveals much about the range of legal possibilities for
managing large events. Outside of the skeletal provisions in the Foreign Missions Act, no
Canadian legislature has yet grasped this nettle.143 Assuming past behaviour to be the most
reliable predictor of future conduct, the greatest likelihood is that this resounding legislative
silence will persist indefinitely. However likely that may be in fact, continuing to pretend either
that police have plenary power or that there is no problem to be addressed would be
unfortunate.144 Such an approach contradicts Canada’s commitment to the rule of law and
perpetuates practical problems of the sort encountered at the G20 Summit. Disorder on the
streets and impossibly confused relationships among police forces and between them and civic or
provincial government are the predictable outcomes. Equally clear, the secret invocation of
statutes violates the very idea of legality and leads to disastrous consequences. While the attempt
to underpin policing measures at the G20 was in itself a good thing, the decision to proceed
secretly was probably the single biggest error made by officials.145
The counter-example of the Olympics demonstrates that a well-crafted municipal bylaw can
do much to bring clarity to the planning and policing of major events. The visible conferral of
legislative authority on an established and accountable law-making body (city council) created
certain defined arrangements for the management and use of public space. A clear scope of
authority emerged that was intelligible to police and public alike. Jurisdictional uncertainty was
minimized. And, unlike Toronto, the municipality asserted itself as an important decision maker
143
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in event management within its jurisdiction while nonetheless respecting, as appropriate, the
special expertise and knowledge of police and security agencies.
There are limitations to local bylaws, however. Most obviously, they are ill-suited to
circumstances where the need for planning of large events spans local jurisdictions. A Vancouver
bylaw had no effect, good or ill, outside of the city limits, just as no arrangements local to
Toronto would have helped in neighbouring municipalities.146 Moreover, bylaws passed ad hoc
for a particular event leave recurrent needs untended to. The bespoke approach requires frequent
re-invention: hockey finals, football championships, political protests, fireworks displays,
demonstrations, international sporting events, a prime minister’s visit to a Board of Trade,
international meetings, outdoor concerts, and major inter-governmental conferences occur with
predictable regularity. Moreover, few municipalities will be able to navigate this tricky terrain
successfully without the guidance of provincial legislation. The City of Vancouver’s success was
possible only because of its significant staff resources, legal expertise, planning prowess – and
because it enjoyed the conferral of special powers by provincial statute. Other municipalities are
unlikely to be able to focus these sorts of resources in a similar fashion. Even in Vancouver, an
imperfect first iteration was improved only following an expensive and consuming court
challenge brought by private citizens: good public policy need not turn on such vagaries.
The management of large-scale events necessarily impacts on the common law’s cherished
rights of assembly, expression (both also protected in the Charter and, within the federal sphere,
by the Canadian Bill of Rights), enjoyment of property (also protected, federally, by the
Canadian Bill of Rights), and freedom of movement.147 A continuing failure to strike the right
balance does ongoing damage to the relations of police to the larger public. The passage of
legislation establishing this balance while providing guidance to police and public alike
regarding what to expect at the wide variety of events that characterize any healthy and free
society can only be helpful.148
Within the federal sphere, there is room for improvement in the Foreign Missions Act. Its
provisions are vague and incomplete. They leave the boundary between provincial and federal
jurisdiction uncertain as well as failing to provide effective guidance to police forces or to the
general public.149 Greater clarity should – and could – be provided to define the boundaries of
federal police jurisdiction, define the types of measures federal police may employ, and outline
the means by which they might employ them. Statutory guidance regarding the proper purpose,
extent, and duration of exclusion zones would be helpful; so too the provision of a framework for
advance notice of closures of public space, mechanisms for limiting access or issuing passes, and
establishing lawful and calculable process by which to evaluate claims for compensation by
146
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those whose homes or businesses are blocked by police barriers. Comprehensive legislation
would provide guidance to authorities with respect to stakeholder consultation and public
communications. If expanded powers of detention and search are needed beyond the boundaries
of conference and delegate accommodation sites, a statutory conferral and definition of the
special powers is needed.
In sum, the lack of statutory frameworks to govern the management of large events conspires
against their successful management. Legislative silence sews confusion among officials at all
levels and leaves the roles of local governments, police forces, and senior governments unclear.
All of this tilts towards the likelihood of operational dysfunction, poor public communications,
and public distrust of the police. Alhough good law does not ensure good outcomes, avoiding
these ills and ensuring the benefits of clarity for police and citizens alike is a good starting point.
Beyond this, as the great jurist Lon Fuller has put it, “the desideratum of clarity represents one of
the most essential ingredients of legality.”150 Accordingly, it is one of the highest duties of
legislators.
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